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Other people, other drugs: the policy response to petrol sniffing among
Indigenous Australians
PETER H. D’ABBS & MAGGIE BRADY
School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, James Cook University (Cairns) and ARC Fellow, Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research (Australian National University), Canberra, Australia
Abstract
This paper examines the policy response of Australian governments to petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities from the 1980s
until the present. During this period, despite the formation of numerous inquiries, working parties and intergovernmental
committees, there has been little accumulation of knowledge about the nature and causes of sniffing, or about the effectiveness of
interventions. Policies are fragmentary; programmes are rarely evaluated, and most rely on short-term funding. The paper sets out
to explain why this should be so. It draws upon a conceptual framework known as ‘analytics of government’ to examine the ways
in which petrol sniffing comes to the attention of government agencies and is perceived as an issue; the mechanisms deployed by
governments to address petrol sniffing; ways in which knowledge about sniffing is generated; and the underlying assumptions
about people that inform policy-making. Drawing upon case studies of policy responses, the paper argues that a number of
structural factors combine to marginalize petrol sniffing as an issue, and to encourage reliance on short-term, one-off interventions
in place of a sustained policy commitment. Four recommendations are advanced to help overcome these factors: (1) agreements
should be reached within and between levels of government on steps to be taken to reduce risk factors before the eruption of petrol-
sniffing crises; (2) the evidence base relevant to petrol sniffing (and other inhalants) should be improved by funding and directing
one or more existing national drug research centres to collate data on inhalant-caused mortality and morbidity, and to conduct or
commission research into prevalence patterns, effectiveness of interventions and other gaps in knowledge; (3) the current pattern of
short-term, pilot and project funding should be replaced with longer-term, evidence-based interventions that address the multiple
risk and protective factors present in communities; and (4) insistence by governments that communities must take ‘ownership’ of
the problem should be replaced by a commitment to genuine partnerships involving governments, non-government and
community sectors. [d’Abbs P, Brady M. Other people, other drugs: the policy response to petrol sniffing among
Indigenous Australians. Drug Alcohol Rev 2004;23:253 – 260]
Key words: drug policy, Indigenous health, inhalants, petrol sniffing, volatile substances.
Introduction
The focus of this paper is not petrol sniffing itself, but
the responses of Australian governments—state, terri-
tory and commonwealth—to petrol sniffing since its
emergence in a number of remote Indigenous commu-
nities in the 1960s. Throughout the 1980s, govern-
ments established numerous working parties, task
forces and interdepartmental committees, as well as a
Senate inquiry, in a search for appropriate policies [1 –
5]. The following decade saw fewer high-level inquiries,
and a trend towards Commonwealth funding for
community-based initiatives such as Petrol Link-up in
Central Australia [6]. Most funding was short term,
and initiatives were rarely evaluated. More recent policy
interventions include a Commonwealth scheme to
subsidize use of aviation fuel as a substitute for petrol
in remote communities, and a one-off allocation of $1
million to programmes in the Northern Territory,
initiated by the Prime Minister in 2001 [7].
Yet despite these efforts, the situation today differs
little from that of 30 years ago. As several recent
inquiries point out, there are still practically no policies
at any levels of government [8,9], nor is there an
accumulated body of knowledge about the nature and
causes of sniffing or about the efficacy or effectiveness
of interventions. Most initiatives continue to rely on
short-term project funding [10].
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Why should this be so? In this paper we attempt to
answer this question. We argue that the processes by
which petrol sniffing periodically gains a place on the
policy agenda, and the ways in which petrol sniffing is
construed as a policy issue, both mitigate against the
development of sustained, evidence-based policies and
programems.
A conceptual framework: governance and the
construction of problems
The conceptual framework underpinning our analysis
draws upon Dean’s ‘analytics of government’ [11].
Dean defines government to include ‘any attempt to
shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our
behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for
a variety of ends’ [11]. Governing, in this sense, is a set
of activities undertaken by a broad range of agencies
over and above those recognized as ‘the government’.
In the case of indigenous petrol sniffing, the list
includes:
. politicians acting as individual politicians, at all
levels of government (including indigenous com-
munity councils);
. politicians acting collectively as ‘the govern-
ment’—again, at all three levels of government;
. bureaucratic agencies, especially in the domains
of health, education, sports and recreation, and
law enforcement—and, in recent years, coroners’
courts; and
. advisory bodies such as the National Drug
Strategy Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Reference Group.
Outside the government sector, other agencies that
periodically seek to influence behaviour related to
petrol sniffing include:
. non-government organizations that manage pet-
rol sniffing intervention programmes;
. large international bodies such as UNICEF and
WorldVision;
. the media;
. researchers and consultants; and
. multi-national corporations, especially petrol
producers such as BP.
Dean identifies four key dimensions of government, as
follows:
(i) ‘fields of visibility’: the ways in which phenom-
ena are envisaged by agencies of government;
(ii) technical aspects of government, i.e. the
‘means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments,
tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabul-
aries’ by means of which agencies of govern-
ment act;
(iii) forms of knowledge and expertise employed in
governing; and
(iv) the ‘formation of identities’—that is ‘the forms
of individual and collective identity’ that
governments recognize and try to promote
[11, p. 32].
In this paper, we examine petrol sniffing with respect to
all four dimensions, with particular attention on the
first three.
Petrol sniffing as a ‘field of visibility’
How does petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities
become visible among all the other issues competing
for policy makers’ attention? Usually, it does so by
erupting periodically into the living rooms of the
public through highly sensational media expose´s,
redolent with images and stories evoking senseless
tragedy, and personal and community crisis. ‘Sniffing
at death’ shouted the front page of the Adelaide
Advertiser’s Saturday Review of 29 December 1984, in
a story featuring close-up photographs of (identifi-
able) Aboriginal children in the Pitjantjatjara lands
with containers of petrol to their noses [12]. Sixteen
years later, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age
showed colour photographs of young Aboriginal boys
sniffing petrol under the banner ‘Deadly visions of
the desert children’ [13] and ‘Desert visions turn
deadly’ [14]. The boys were easily identifiable, as was
the method of inhalation. (The captions also con-
tained an unfortunate double entendre, in that the word
‘deadly’ in Indigenous youth argot carries positive
connotations of ‘coolness’.) Paul Toohey’s article
headed ‘A generation stolen by the fumes’ (15)
appeared 2 weeks later in the UK Sunday Telegraph
under the headline ‘Babies hooked on petrol fumes’
[16].
The media portrayal of Aboriginal petrol sniffing is
worthy of a study in its own right; in particular, one
might ask why acts of petrol sniffing are represented
implicitly not merely as instances of individual self-
harm, but as evidence of a broader community
disintegration in a way that heroin use, for example, is
never portrayed.
Another salient characteristic of petrol sniffing as an
issue is the absence of any lobby groups or other
agencies with the capacity to keep the issue on the
public agenda in anything more than a transient
manner. Kingdon, in his study of policy making in
the United States, notes that issues gain a place on the
public agenda by being transformed from ‘conditions’
to ‘problems’ [17]. This can happen by a variety of
processes: statistics, for example, might be cited to

































draw attention to a disturbing trend, such as the
increase in obesity in Australia, or an issue might be the
subject of sustained lobbying by interest groups, as
domestic violence was gradually forced onto the policy
agenda in the 1970s. Petrol sniffing, by contrast, is a
product of neither statistical trends nor sustained
lobbying; as a public issue, it owes almost everything
to media outbursts (although in recent years at least two
coronial inquests have drawn attention to the issue in a
way that might yet generate pressures for change).
One result is that whatever pressure for action that
emerges is usually for a quick, short-term response.
Often it comes from individual politicians, who are
either genuinely moved by the media accounts, or do
not wish to be seen as unresponsive. Because petrol
sniffing is seen in the first instance as destroying the
health of sniffers, this pressure falls initially on agencies
in the health sector.
In responding, however, health bureaucracies face
other constraints. Experiences gained by one of us
(Pd’A) suggest that at least five sets of factors dictate
priorities. First, bureaucrats have to manage budgets,
usually tight budgets. Consequently, they will pay
attention to problems that threaten to blow out
budgets. Secondly, while bureaucrats are bound to
heed the political directives of the government of the
day, the extent to which they also respond to political
pressures emanating from elsewhere is more open to
discretion. Thirdly, health agencies attend to major
sources of morbidity and mortality. This third factor
tends to interact with a fourth: perceived efficacy and
effectiveness of available interventions. That is to say,
health bureaucracies, like other agencies, prefer to
direct limited resources where they can reasonably hope
to achieve results and, conversely, to limit allocation
where they see little prospect of results, sometimes by
attempting to redefine an issue as someone else’s
problem. Finally, health bureaucracies tend to be
preoccupied with issues and problems that threaten
their capacity to maintain a stable, qualified work-force.
How is petrol sniffing among Indigenous people
perceived within this context? First, it does not generate
the pressure on limited budgets with which bureaucrats
must deal on a day-to-day basis, except perhaps in the
case of a small number of sniffers and ex-sniffers who
suffer permanent and serious disabilities. Nor is petrol
sniffing a major contributor to indigenous morbidity or
mortality. Alongside the harm wrought by chronic
diseases, alcohol-related violence and tobacco use, it is
barely visible. Further, the tools available to the health
sector for responding to petrol sniffing—such as health
promotion and guidance in clinical management of
sniffers—are of limited efficacy. Finally, petrol sniffing
in communities rarely generates problems in recruiting
and retaining staff (unlike, for instance, alcohol-related
hostility towards health-centre staff).
There are, in short, any number of reasons why
health bureaucracies should be preoccupied at any
given time by issues more pressing than petrol sniffing
in remote communities. In effect, they are in a cross-
fire: pressured from outside by the media and/or
particular politicians to act in response to a problem
that is not, from where they sit, among their most
critical challenges. This situation tends to have three
consequences: first, while the agencies will take some
sort of action, they will try to avoid diverting resources
from other areas that are seen as ongoing priorities, or
that are seen as representing better returns on
expenditure. Secondly, the desire to refocus on what
are seen internally as more important issues creates an
incentive to make a visible gesture—such as funding a
non-government organization to conduct a one-off
project—and then return to the main game. Thirdly,
the agency is unlikely to harbour a section or even a
network of individuals with an ongoing interest in
keeping petrol sniffing high on the agenda of priorities.
As one experienced public servant in the Northern
Territory, interviewed for this study, put it: ‘As soon as
you raise the issue of petrol sniffing in the public
service, people duck for cover. They go on leave. They
disappear.’
In short, health bureaucracies are structurally moti-
vated to take short-term action that is unlikely to be
informed by a constituency of expertise, either internal
or external. If policy of any sort emerges, it will
probably be what another public servant, this time with
the Commonwealth, described as ‘policy on the run’.
To the extent that it does command bureaucratic
attention, the way in which petrol sniffing is con-
ceptualized is shaped by two further factors: first, it is
viewed as an instance of inhalant misuse or volatile
substance misuse, which in turn is framed within a
broader discourse of substance misuse. Secondly, it is
seen as an Indigenous issue. We consider briefly the
implications.
Within discourses of substance misuse, inhalants
occupy a marginal position. To begin with, they do not
fit neatly into a licit/illicit drug taxonomy. Usually they
are categorized in a residual ‘other drugs’ category,
where they may or may not be distinguished further as
petrol sniffing, glue sniffing, chroming etc. Secondly,
the key concepts and theories that inform drug abuse—
such as dependency and withdrawal—are of question-
able value in addressing what is, after all, a pattern of
behaviour grounded clearly in social and economic
disadvantage.
Petrol sniffing among Indigenous Australians is all
but invisible in contemporary drug policy. The
National Drug Strategic Framework 1998 – 99 to
2002 – 03 makes just two references to the issue, the
first to inform readers that the ‘proportion of Indigen-
ous Australians who had used inhalants or kava in the

































12 months preceding the survey could not be reliably
estimated’ [18, p. 5], the second to highlight the
dangers:
Petrol sniffing is one of the most dangerous forms of
inhalant use and prolonged sniffing can lead to long-
term disability. The behaviours associated with
inhalant use and the long-term care of people who
use inhalants can be extremely distressing, disruptive
and debilitating for the families and communities
involved [18, p. 10].
Similarly, the National Action Plan on Illicit Drugs
2001 to 2002 – 03 skirts around inhalants by stating that
they would be covered in a separate complementary
strategy to be prepared for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander drug use issues [19]. A background paper
accompanying the National Action Plan includes a
section headed ‘Illicit drug use among Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples’ which makes no
reference to inhalants, volatile substances or petrol
sniffing [20]. Finally, Fitzgerald and Seward’s recent
study of drug policy in Australia, published by the
Australian National Council on Drugs, makes no
reference to petrol sniffing, volatile substances or
inhalants [21].
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’
Complementary Action Plan, released in August 2003,
makes four proposals in relation to volatile substance
misuse:
. encourage exchange among communities of
strategies to reduce harm associated with volatile
substances (e.g. night patrols, aviation fuel);
. enforce penalties for inappropriate sales of volatile
substances and tobacco;
. develop community education resources as well
as targeted educational resources for selected
groups such as parents; and
. support communities to conduct action research
on early intervention among inhalant users [22].
Petrol sniffing’s marginal status can be traced at least to
the origins of Australia’s current national drug policy in
the 1985 National Campaign Against Drug Abuse
(NCADA). NCADA’s initial focus was on illicit drugs,
alcohol and tobacco. Petrol sniffing was not a priority.
One of the earliest publications released by NCADA—
entitled An Australian Guide to Drug Issues—noted
inhalants as ‘other’ [23]. One of us (MB) recalls
phoning the NCADA office at about this time to ask
about resources on petrol sniffing, only to be told that
petrol was not part of NCADA ‘because it was
Aborigines’!
This bizarre response testifies to the influence of the
second factor mentioned above. At the time of
NCADA’s formation Aboriginal affairs had become in
effect quarantined from the major thrust of national
policy-making and analysis. Indigenous health matters
were dealt with by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs
(DAA), and later by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commision (ATSIC), neither of which was
linked bureaucratically to the health department, but
reported instead to it’s own minister. Documents
produced by these agencies, such as the National
Aboriginal Health Strategy [24], frequently stressed
cultural difference and the ‘special case’ of Aborigines.
Not surprisingly, an evaluation of the first 3 years of
NCADA found that Aboriginal people had derived
little benefit from the campaign [25].
In 1995, responsibility for administering Common-
wealth funds for Aboriginal alcohol and other drug
programmes was transferred back to the mainstream
health bureaucracy. However, the ideas within which
these programmes were framed remained outside
mainstream alcohol and other drugs discourses, being
derived instead from a contemporary Aboriginal policy
framework. In remote regions, this was characterized by
what O’Malley has termed ‘governing at a distance’
[26]. In place of the pervasive regulation of Aboriginal
life in administered settlements, as had occurred during
the assimilationist policies of the 1950s and 1960s,
governance was based on enlisting Indigenous forms of
social organization and control—or, rather, what
agencies of the state perceived to be Indigenous
forms—to manage Indigenous behaviour. The purpose
was no longer tutelage for full citizenship in a
monocultural Australia but rather the fostering of self-
determining subjects who would be enriched and
empowered through their own Indigenous cultural
traditions.
The new policy was part of a broader shift in the
principles of governance initiated at the time through-
out many liberal democracies, away from governance
through centralized regulation, towards more decen-
tralized, indirect forms of social control, aimed at
fostering self-regulating consumers ready to take their
place in a competitive society. Central to these changes
in the domain of governing Indigenous Australians has
been the strategy of enlisting ‘communities’ [26].
Aboriginal communities are expected to articulate
aspirations which are then taken as authentic manifes-
tations of ‘self-determination’—as long as they accord
more or less with what the state wants them to choose.
In an acerbic account of these processes in one
Northern Territory locality, Cowlishaw describes four
stratagems by means of which government bureaucrats
deal with discrepancies between ‘communities’ as
ideologically defined and the observed reality in front
of them. The first is through endless meetings, at which
officials purport to obtain the agreement of ‘the
community’ to appropriate decisions. The second she

































calls ‘ventriloquism’: the practice of white officials
concealing their own role in decision-making by
claiming that decisions have been taken by Aboriginal
people. The third is the use of a notion of ‘culture’ that
purports to represent Aboriginal tradition but that,
Cowlishaw argues, is neither informed by nor recog-
nizes the multi-faceted, interwoven strands of Indigen-
ous sociality. The fourth is the attempt to define
separate private and public spheres in which ‘the
community’, far from representing a pre-existing,
Indigenous social entity, is construed as a public space
which then becomes the legitimate domain of govern-
ment-supported programs [27].
In one sense, then, communities are the creations of
the state, designed to facilitate the purposes of the
state in accord with the principles of contemporary
governance in an advanced liberal society. Among
these purposes is the assumption of primary respon-
sibility for preventing and responding to petrol
sniffing—not to mention a host of other issues.
Perhaps the crudest statement of community respon-
sibility for petrol sniffing was a comment made by
then Aboriginal Affairs Minister Clyde Holding in
1984. Challenged by a national Aboriginal child care
agency to provide $5 million to address petrol sniffing,
$2.5 million of which was to be used to assist
communities in north-western South Australia, Hold-
ing retorted: ‘The communities just opt out and say all
that is needed to solve the problem is $2.5 million.
Why $2.5? Why not $20 million? How much money
do you need to take a petrol can from a kid when you
see him sniffing in front of you? Let’s address this
problem in real terms’ [12].
A few observers have long questioned the wisdom of
this ‘hands-off’ approach by government. In 1977 a
Northern Territory Welfare Officer wrote:
I do not agree with the very common attitude that
because these are problems of the Aboriginal people
that they [the Aboriginals] have to find the answers. I
see this as an excuse by the authorities responsible to
abdicate that responsibility and involvement; and
they do it under the very admirable guise of ‘self-
determination’ (G. Sargent cited in [28, p. 125]).
Aboriginal people have been even more forthright.
Kawaki Thompson, father of a young man from Central
Australia who died from sniffing petrol, told a recent
coronial inquiry:
There has been petrol sniffing since the 1950s. Who
is responsible? The petrol doesn’t belong to us. It is
not part of Anangu law. It was introduced to the
Lands by white people. It is important that Anangu
revive their culture and hold on to their culture. The
problem with petrol comes from outside, it’s like the
Maralinga bomb tests, the solution should come
from the outside too [9, Thompson report, p. 19].
Such views, however, have had little impact on
policy. A strategy outlined by the Department of
Aboriginal Affairs in 1987 drew on an earlier Senate
inquiry to state in its opening paragraph that ‘actions in
response to petrol sniffing should originate from and be
controlled by the Aboriginal people in each community
where petrol sniffing is a problem’ [2, Attachment G].
The Department’s role was to ‘act as a resource to
encourage and support community initiatives’.
Ironically, the Department’s own deliberations ex-
posed the problematic nature of this position. At a
petrol sniffing conference held in Perth in September
1987, those present agreed that petrol sniffing resulted
primarily from ‘disempowerment of the people and
erosion of their own forms of authority’, and that petrol
sniffing ‘was a symptom of a process of social
deterioration rather than the focal problem itself’ [2].
In 2003, the question remained unanswered by
governments. As Dr Paul Torzillo, a respiratory
physician with long-term experience in central Austra-
lian communities, told a coronial inquiry held in 2002
into the deaths of three petrol sniffers:
There seems to be a widespread view within
government. . .that this is a problem which the
community should solve, it is their responsibility.
This is a community with less resources and ability to
control a tough problem than any mainstream
community. . .and secondly, that’s not a demand
that’s put on any other community in the country.
No-one, no politician and no bureaucracy expects
that a suburb like—so the people of Cabramatta are
not told that they have to solve the heroin problem
and it’s up to them to do it [9, Thompson report, p.
20].
Coroner Chivell agreed: ‘Governments’, he insisted
in his findings, ‘should not approach the task on the
basis that the solutions must come from Anangu
communities alone’ [9, Thompson report, p. 74].
Together, these structural constraints and discursive
frameworks have shaped the responses of various
governments to Aboriginal petrol sniffing over the past
three decades, in ways that we shall now briefly
consider.
Petrol sniffing and techniques of government
In a review of interventions into petrol sniffing, d’Abbs
& MacLean [29] identified a large number of pro-
grammes, including in the area of primary prevention,
recreation programmes, education, substitution of
petrol with aviation fuel, locking up petrol supplies,

































adding deterrents to petrol, movements to homelands
centres and legal sanctions against sniffing, and use of
Aboriginal culture and symbolism. Interventions tar-
geting at-risk or user populations include individual
and family counselling, community wardens and night
patrols and guidance in harm minimization. Finally, in
the area of tertiary intervention, both hospital treatment
and residential rehabilitation programmes have been
utilized.
We do not discuss these measures here. Those
seeking further information are referred to the mono-
graph itself, or to a shorter journal article summarizing
the main findings [30]. Instead, we wish to highlight a
number of characteristics of prevailing approaches to
interventions. First, because petrol sniffing is not seen
as a genuine ongoing priority issue that falls neatly into
any one department’s or even one government’s scope
of responsibility, governments have tended not to
engage in direct service provision, but rather to fund
community-based groups and other non-government
organizations to provide services. This, of course, also
accords with the view of petrol sniffing as a community
responsibility. Secondly, and again in light of petrol
sniffing’s low priority, most initiatives have been funded
on an ad hoc, short-term basis, with virtually no
commitment to rigorous evaluation or to providing
ongoing funding to those programmes that demon-
strate successful outcomes. Thirdly, because so few
programmes are evaluated, and because no one sector
in any bureaucracy has an interest in maintaining
sustained attention on the problem, the efforts that have
been made have not generated an evidence base that
might inform future policy-making and programme
funding. (A welcome exception to this pattern is the
decision to evaluate the ‘Comgas’ scheme. This is a
subsidy introduced in 1998 under which the Com-
monwealth meets the cost of excise duty on aviation
fuel, used in some communities as a harm minimization
device and alternative to petrol.) Fourthly, in the
absence of an evidence base, and because petrol sniffing
straddles political jurisdictions as well as departmental
‘silos’, governments have tended to respond to petrol
sniffing crises by convening high-level inter-govern-
mental committees involving commonwealth and state/
territory officials. In no instances to date, however, have
these committees succeeded in implementing a co-
ordinated, sustained approach to the prevention or
treatment of sniffing.
The reasons for these repeated failures lie, we
suggest, in the factors we have outlined above. Coroner
Chivell, commenting on the most recent of these
committees—namely, the South Australian Govern-
ment’s Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmen-
tal Inter-Agency Collaboration Committee and the
Commonwealth-administered Central Australian Cross
Border Reference Group—remarked caustically that
both seemed to be stuck in the ‘information gathering’
phase, and added: ‘There is no need for further
information gathering, and there is a vast untapped
pool of professional expertise to be utilised. What is
missing is prompt, forthright, properly planned, prop-
erly funded action’ [9, Thompson report, p. 34].
Knowledge, expertise and petrol sniffing
Is there, as Chivell asserts, ‘a vast untapped pool of
professional expertise to be utilised’? In making these
comments, Chivell rightly condemns bureaucratic
inertia and dismisses the claim that we cannot act
because of lack of information. At the inquiry, the
coroner heard claims that considerable research had
already been conducted into petrol sniffing, and that
lack of knowledge was not a legitimate barrier to action.
At the same time, Chivell himself concluded that, as a
phenomenon, petrol sniffing remained poorly under-
stood [9].
What are we to make of this apparent paradox? In the
face of governments’ apparent unwillingness to act, any
exercise in data-gathering in the name of research can
constitute self-serving indulgence. However, if research
and the knowledge it generates are never sufficient
conditions for coherent policies and programmes, they
are necessary conditions, and if we compare petrol
sniffing with other categories of substance misuse, ‘the
vast untapped pool of professional expertise’ looks
somewhat shallower than Chivell implies.
Effective targeted policies and interventions require
at least three kinds of knowledge: first, epidemiological
data about prevalence patterns, distribution and corre-
lations with other phenomena of interest; secondly,
knowledge about the efficacy and effectiveness of
interventions and factors that influence effectiveness;
and thirdly, knowledge about the ways in which
inhalants affect physical and mental functioning. While
a limited amount of research into all of these areas has
been conducted, both in Australia and overseas, petrol
sniffing has attracted relatively little research attention.
For example, the two leading drug research institutes in
Australia are the National Drug and Alcohol Research
Centre (NDARC), attached to the University of New
South Wales, and the Perth-based National Drug
Research Institute (NDRI), attached to Curtin Uni-
versity of Technology. The former is orientated towards
treatment-related research, the latter towards preven-
tion research. A search of NDARC’s publications list of
several hundred journal articles, monographs and
technical reports, as listed on their website [http://
ndarc.med.unsw.edu.au/ndarc.nsf/website/Publication-
s.articles], failed to reveal a single publication focusing
on petrol sniffing, inhalants or volatile substances. A
similar publications search on NDRI’s website found
one evaluation report published in 1989 [31] and one

































letter published in the Medical Journal of Australia in
1993 [32]. This is not to suggest that aspects of petrol
sniffing or other volatile substance use are not covered
in other publications from these centres, as part of, for
instance, overviews of trends in drug use patterns; but
the near total absence of any publications that feature
inhalants is a telling indicator of the place that inhalants
occupy in mainstream drug research in Australia.
Moreover, as the earlier quotation from the National
Drug Strategic Framework implied, petrol sniffing in
Indigenous communities is rarely captured in national
drug use surveys, in part because samples are usually
drawn from people aged 14 or 15 years and over,
thereby excluding many sniffers, and in part because
the restriction of sniffing to isolated geographical
locations and its episodic nature render it invisible in
all but the largest samples.
In short, the lack of any sustained institutional
interest in petrol sniffing among government agencies
is matched by a dearth of high quality research.
Petrol sniffing and the formation of identities
The final dimension of ‘governance’ being considered
here has received less attention than the other three: it
refers to the assumptions made by governing agencies
about the kinds of people they are dealing with and the
kinds of people they strive to foster. O’Malley argues
that contemporary governance of Indigenous people in
Australia—in parallel with non-Indigenous govern-
ance—seeks to promote what he has labelled ‘self-
determining subjects of liberalism’ [26, p. 168]. We do
not elaborate the point here, but it could be argued that
petrol sniffing—especially as it is usually portrayed in
the media—represents an all-too-literal ‘in your face’
affront to this goal, in that it exposes the fallacy behind
the notion that disempowered people who are trapped
in poverty will play the part that contemporary
governance holds out for them.
Where to now?
In sum, petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities
appears episodically on the public policy agenda thanks
mainly to (often sensational) media accounts; unsup-
ported by any sustained lobbying, however, the issue
vanishes almost as quickly as it appears. From the
vantage point of government bureaucracies, it tends to
be crowded out by other, more pressing issues. As a
policy issue, it tends to fall between levels of govern-
ment and, within levels, between departmental ‘silos’.
Within discourses of drug treatment and policy, petrol
sniffing—along with inhalants generally—is margin-
alized further. Finally, government responses have been
shaped by a policy discourse in which Aboriginal ‘self-
determination’ has been conflated with notions of
‘community responsibility’ in a manner that pays no
heed to the capacities or resources available to most
communities.
The implications of our analysis are, we suggest,
sobering: none of the factors outlined in this paper lend
themselves readily to modification. However much we
might wish it otherwise, petrol sniffing in remote
Aboriginal communities is not likely to become a
long-term policy priority, given the presence of so many
competing claims on attention and resources. So what
should be done? We propose four modest, practical
steps that could usefully be taken to improve the policy
foundation without imposing a major demand on
resources. First, it must be possible—especially in an
environment where so many agencies claim to espouse
a ‘whole of government’ approach—for agreement to be
reached between relevant departments at one level of
government, and between levels of government, on a
series of steps to be taken to reduce risk factors before
the eruption of yet another media-generated crisis. For
example, it has long been known—but it still needs to
be said—that youth workers and appropriately trained
and supported recreation officers have a major con-
tribution to make in the prevention of inhalant abuse. A
coordinated approach to the provision of these
resources, based on systematically reducing risk factors
in inhalant-prone environments, should be implemen-
ted. Secondly, the evidence base relevant to petrol
sniffing (and other inhalants) could be increased by
utilizing one or more of the existing national drug
research centres. These centres should be funded and
directed to conduct or commission research into
prevalence patterns, effectiveness of interventions and
other current gaps in knowledge, and to publish regular
bulletins of national data on inhalant-caused deaths and
hospitalizations, similar to the National Alcohol In-
dicators Bulletins published by the National Drug
Research Institute. This would serve to encourage
better compilation of coronial data from different
jurisdictions, highlight the difficulties in collating such
data and provide the basis of a formal nationwide
collection of statistics on the impact of petrol sniffing
and other inhalants on morbidity and mortality.
Thirdly, petrol sniffing is too complex an issue to be
addressed through short-term pilot and project fund-
ing; it requires, rather, longer-term interventions that
address the multiple risk and protective factors present
in communities, and that build upon programmes that
have been shown to be effective. Finally, while
communities must be partners in any programme to
address petrol sniffing, the notion that government
agencies can sit back and insist that communities take
‘ownership’ of the problem, and that all governments
need to do is provide intermittent project grants to
community groups, needs to be exposed and rejected.
A genuine partnership approach involving government,

































non-government and community sectors, committed to
collating, utilizing and building on evidence of effec-
tiveness, has the potential to reduce significantly the
present tragic waste of personal and community
opportunities wrought by petrol sniffing.
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